Crosspost from my spacehey, enjoy
The core thesis; there is no individual that can arise because it is necessary.
The Genealogy of the Individual
If one realizes that heritage is what informs the otherwise stochastic nature of things you experience, (that is to say, the experiences you are subjected to are informed by the heritage of whomever or whatever causes that experience) then one will eventually realize that heritage is what experiences derive from, and are not independent of their origin. If one were to derive something from something that has no heritage, or if one has no heritage, than this is a philosophical non-sequitur. Everything has a heritage regardless of whether or not one is conscious of it. One may simply never open their eyes to the intrinsic heritage they have, but a lack of observation does not translate to non-existence. It is therefore that we may see that the individual is a causality; the totality exists, and therefore there necessarily exists the totality that may be considered individually. In other words, the individual is "individualized" by that which they may set apart as individual. Assuming the prior premises are true, it may be clearly surmised that the individual cannot occur in a vacuum; an individual is not an isolated effort and does not exist on its own, as an individual only finds individuality and community in an existence beyond itself. Should these premises be understood, then I am not mistaken in taking the point to its logical conclusion. The individual is a social phenomena shaped by the totality in which it exists, the heritage in which it stems from, and therefore can only be considered as a constituency of a totality rather than being wholly independent in and of itself. It would therefore seem ridiculous to claim that the individual exists as an independent consideration, something that has ought to be treated as sacred and inviolable as though it exists without the effort of its antecedents, indeed without the existence of its antecedents. If something that does not take place in the formative world exists, then it is necessarily subjective. If the individual does not take place within the formative world, it is necessarily subjective. The individual does not necessarily fail to exist, it fails to root itself in objectivity. Therefore, to trust the entire basis of reality being contingent on what the individual determines it to is, too, a logical failure.
The core thesis; there is no subjectivity if objectivity does not exist.
The Genealogy of Objectivity
There is a difference between knowing that something is true, and a truth going unobserved. Just because there is no organ delineating the absolute limits of that which is ultimately true or untrue does not mean that objective truth does not exist. Nor is culture, heritage and blood contingent exclusively on language or some form of subjectivity; consider that color objectively exists, and that just because the way humans identify it is dependent on internal thought and understanding, it does not make it any less real. Does reality depend upon human consensus? Certainly not. The premise that humans cannot understand existence or non-existence of absolutes simply because a divine element does not exist is simply not true. No, culture, heritage and blood are not dependent on the human mind, they are depend on the human. Just because we are required to translate existing concepts into mechanisms perceptible to humans does not mean that these concepts are fundamentally a human invention. I know when someone dies, they are objectively dead. I know that when I see a color, I am objectively observing that particular wavelength. Human understanding is dependent on that which exists to be understood; any refutation of this must assume that nothing outside of one individuals ego exists, which is yet another falsehood on the basis that the subjective must necessarily derive from the objective. The lack of one implies the existence of neither. If subjectivity is drawn upon objectivity, then morality must exist in some way or another. A flawed understanding of objectivity results in a failure in subjective principles and ideas, and in taking this point further we will also reveal that the various shapes of egoism and solipsism that take form must be entirely false based simply on the premise that it fails to recognize what exactly objectivity is. The common objection to this is that morality does not exist if one simply chooses to operate on a system of power and consequences rather than right and wrong. If this were true, than negative results of temporarily positive things would necessarily have to be considered positive, and vice versa; nor is a framework lacking the fundamental truth that objectivity and subjectivity are dependent capable of sustaining the notion of positive and negative in the first place, if it could, it would then be forced to recognize that human biological concepts or just concepts of wealth and power and consequences are themselves obfuscations.
The core thesis; objective reality creates the conditions under which moral presuppositions may be objectively evaluated.
The Genealogy of Morality
Not to be outdone by Nietzsche, of course. Anywho, let us consider the following: human beings objectively exist, and by necessity possess objectively existing psychological and biological characteristics. By necessity and, indeed, by basic observation, we may also deduce that we experience objectively identifiable conditions; suffering, deprivation, satisfaction, and social dependence. Regardless of whether or not these conditions are perceived, or if the so-called individual simply ignores them, they must exist. Clearly, the conditions relevant to moral judgement proceed the subjective interpretation of these conditions. So, why can't moral judgments be entirely arbitrary? Simply put, subjective moral judgment cannot establish its own subjective validity just because it is subjectively held. The analysis of the conditions that brought about the subjective judgement or, rather, the simple fact that this analysis is brought about because of pre-existing and objectively real factors, is what establishes subjective moral judgment. If individuals are constituted through relationships and with an antecedent social and biological world, their actions cannot be understood exclusively through their individual preferences. Because every condition exists beyond their individual agency, their actions cannot be evaluated exclusively through their own subjective preferences. Of course, we have not yet proven with precision that there exists a particular moral obligation, and to do so we must address the is-ought problem head on. Can we determine from what is to what it ought to be? I see no reason to believe not. For this, I bring to the fore the premises of epistemology, axiology, and teleology. In what order do these things occur? I raise the point that it is epistemology, how we know what is true or real. I have already described in detail the transition from objectivity to subjectivity; this needs no further explanation. How exactly axiology, what has value and aesthetics, is derived from this, is what we must answer. With epistemology we are already aware enough that it involves an evaluative dimension. We distinguish between justified and unjustified beliefs, reliable and unreliable methods, in order to reach the most accurate conclusion. This is the very method by which things as fundamental as the scientific method exist. These are not moral judgments, but we can derive a basic premise from this in that value is not an arbitrary addition to knowledge; evaluation is already involved in the process of knowing. Knowledge is valuable because it allows us to understand reality more accurately. Each and every question in reference to this idea inherently produces a practical evaluation. The fundamental idea I am laying out here is that rational agency presupposes normative commitments. The very idea of making an argument implicitly treats consistency, intelligibility, and truthfulness as standards worth respecting. To cut a long story short, normative commitments are implicit in the activities and capacities of rational agents. The very existence of knowledge, argumentation, and observation presupposes an objective system of value. The very existence of language suggests the same; words must presuppose an objective description or value in its usage.Â
Comments
Displaying 0 of 0 comments ( View all | Add Comment )